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『学术报告』Equilibrium Refinement in Security Games



Equilibrium Refinement in Security Games

报告人 Bo AN


Game theory is an increasingly important paradigm for reasoning about complex security resource allocation and patrolling problems. Much of this work uses Stackelberg game models to represent the commitment that the security forces make to a security policy, and the capability of attackers to use surveillance to learn about the policy during the planning phase of an attack. Two important examples of this are ARMOR used at the LAX Airport to randomize checkpoint placement and canine patrols, and IRIS used by the Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS) to schedule air marshals. In this talk I will first describe game-theoretic models for security domains and some real-world applications. Then I will present our most recent work on equilibrium refinement for robustness improvement.


Bo An is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Southern California. He received the Ph.D degree in Computer Science from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst in 2010. Prior to that, he received the B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees in computer science from Chongqing University, China. His research interests include artificial intelligence, multi-agent systems, automated negotiation, electronic commerce, resource allocation, distributed systems, game theory, and optimization. He has served as program committee members for top conferences such as AAMAS and has published over 20 papers at top conferences (e.g., AAMAS, IJCAI, and AAAI) and journals (e.g., JAAMAS, IEEE Transactions) . Recently, He won the 2010 IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished